谁之运气? 何种正义?——正义的哲学创新与道德责任

Whose Luck? Which Justice? : The Philosophical Innovation of Justice and Its Social Responsibility

《正义论》之前,运气与正义之间的关联并未受到人们的关注,直到罗尔斯将平等纳入正义的视野并把运气作为正义的首要应用对象,方开以运气看待正义之先河。随后,德沃金区分了"原生运气"和"选项运气",从而开启了平等主义对运气和责任加以切割的基本理论范式,遂成为运气均等主义之滥觞。虽然由于未能找到恰当的平等通货,以致运气均等主义最终走向失败,但该流派在正义的理论创新以及对运气的道德关怀方面所做的努力为我们反思哲学的理论创新与社会担当提供了很好的范例。

Before A Theory of Justice, the relation between luck and justice remains undiscovered, until Rawls takes fairness into the horizon of justice and luck as the primary application object of justice, the precedent of considering justice through luck has been set. After then, Dworkin distinguishes ＂brute luck＂ and ＂option luck＂, which opens the basic theory paradigm of the cut between luck and responsibility and becomes the beginning of luck egalitarianism. Because of not finding the proper fairness currency so that luck egalitarianism finally failed, but the endeavor of this school in the aspects of theoretical innovation of justiee and the moral concern to luck has provide a good example for us to rethink theoretical innovation of philosophy and its social responsibility.