摘要
在分析CCS特征与利益相关者的基础上,指出我国政府与电站间CCS技术扩散存在的困境,由此构建博弈模型,分析技术扩散过程中两个博弈方的收益。数值算例研究得出政府给予电站补贴后双方都受益,并且政府受益的程度更大。最后针对政府补贴、激励与奖惩提出了3条政策建议,(1)加强对政府补贴资金的监管;(2)继续推广CCS技术及示范项目;(3)加大CCS技术的基础性研究力度。
Based on the analysis of characteristics and stakeholders of CCS, the paper points out difficulties of CCS tech- nology diffusion between government and power plants in China, and builds a game model to analyze the revenue of both players during the process of technology diffusion. Based on numerical examples, the paper concludes that both sides bene- fit with a greater degree of government after the subsidies of government. Finally, it offers recommendations for government subsidies and incentives.
作者
张琪
张慧明
郑宇
ZHANG Qi ZHANG Huiming ZHENG Yu(School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Nanjing 210044, China)
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第6期112-117,共6页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
教育部人文社科基金项目"碳捕捉与碳储存技术扩散的形成机制研究"(10YJC630381)
关键词
碳捕捉与储存技术
技术扩散
博弈模型
carbon capture and storage
technology diffusion
game model