基于相对业绩比较的双标准成本控制契约研究

Double standard cost control contract based on relative performance evaluation

在企业成本控制活动中,管理者和工人间产生了委托代理问题,并由此签订双标准成本控制契约.针对工人成本控制业绩受到的较大干扰可能导致激励契约失效的问题,在成本管理系统框架下将三维度相对业绩引入双标准成本控制契约,研究了引入相对业绩后,相关参数对契约中最优激励系数和最优调节系数的作用方式,和成本控制激励机制的改善机理.结果表明:最优激励系数与工人能力、相对业绩协方差的平方呈正相关,与工人努力成本系数、风险规避度、外界不确定因素方差和相对业绩方差呈负相关;任一维度相对业绩的调节系数仅与该维度业绩的协方差和方差相关;引入相对业绩可有效改善成本控制激励机制,而工人成本控制方面的素质、外部风险和被过滤风险因素所占总风险的地位均可影响激励机制的改善效果.

In the cost control activities of enterprises, there exists a principal-agent relationship between man- agers and workers. Accordingly, they sign a double standard cost control contract. To overcome the problem that large interference on the workers＇ cost control performance will lead to a failure of the contract, this paper introduces three-dimension relative performance to the double standard cost control contract under the cost management system, studies the effect of related parameters on the optimal incentive coefficient and optimal adjustment coefficient, and investigates the improvement mechanism of the incentive system after introducing relative performance. Results show that： The optimal incentive coefficient is positively related to the cost con- trol ability and the square of the relative performance covariance, and is negatively related to the efforts cost coefficient, risk aversion, the variance of the external risk factors, and relative performance. The adjustment coefficients of any dimension of relative performance is only related with the covariance and variance of the respective dimension. The introduction of relative performance can effectively improve the cost control incen- tive mechanism, quality in cost control of workers, external risk, and the importance of risk factors removed can all affect the improving effect.