经理人嫉妒心理与企业过度投资——股权制衡和两职分离的调节作用

Managers' Jealousy and Over-investment——The Regulation Effect of Ownership Restriction and Separated Leadership

本文以1113家上市公司为研究样本,对经理人嫉妒心理与企业过度投资之间的关系进行了研究,并检验股权制衡和两职分离对经理人嫉妒心理与企业过度投资的调节效应。研究发现:经理人嫉妒心越强,越倾向于过度投资;股权制衡度、两职分离对经理人嫉妒心理与企业过度投资有负向调节作用。这些结果表明经理人嫉妒心理导致的投资是一种有损企业投资绩效的行为,制衡度高的股权结构与两职分离的组织结构在一定程度上充当了嫉妒心理负面影响的"缓冲剂"。

By analyzing the data of 1113 listed companies in China, this paper studies the relationship between managers＇ jealousy psychology and over - investment, and tests the moderating effects of equity degree of balance and separated leadership. We make the fol- lowing conclusions： the strorrger managers＇ jealousy, the more inclined to excessive investment; ownership restriction and separated lead- ership have negative moderating effect on the relationship between managers＇ jealousy psychology and over- investment. These results indi- cate that investment caused by managers＇ jealousy is a damage for investment performance. To some extent, high balance degree of equity structure and duality of organization structure acted as a ＂buffer＂ of jealousy negative impacts.