战略性新兴产业共性技术协同创新中的政府补贴研究——基于三重螺旋视域

Study on Governmental Subsidy in Collaborative Innovation of Generic Technology for Strategic Emerging Industries——Based on the Perspective of Triple Helix

在三重螺旋视域下构建了政府对企业和大学(科研机构)协同创新战略性新兴产业共性技术予以补贴的博弈模型,分别研究了纳什均衡、斯坦克尔伯格均衡和合作均衡条件下的政府补贴问题。研究表明:政府补贴可以有效平衡企业和大学(科研机构)的利益分配结构;共性技术的复杂程度越高、可获得性越难、应用范围越广、经济社会效益越大,政府给予的资助越多;在收益相同的前提下,合作博弈下政府付出的补贴成本要小于非合作博弈。

From the perspective of triple helix, this paper constructs a game model in which the governmentprovides enterj^rises and a universities （ scientific research institutions） subsidy for generic technology of cooperative innovation in strategic emerging industries, and respectively studies the problems of three conditions of Nash equilibrium,Stackelberg equilibrium and cooperative equilibrium. The results show thatgovernmental subsidy can effectively balance the benefit distribution structure between enterprises and universities（ scientific research institutions） ; the government should give more aids to those generic technologies witli highercomplexity, difficult acquirement, wider application and greater economic and social benefits ; governmentalsubsidy cost of tiie cooperative game should be less than that of the non-cooperative game in the premise of thesame benefits.