不同决策模式下制造商与再制造商的博弈策略研究

Research on the Game Strategies for the OEM and the Remanufacturer Under Different Decision Structures

在考虑产品回收再制造的闭环供应链中,原始制造商如何应对外部再制造商的竞争威胁是其面临的重要决策问题。针对由制造商和再制造商组成的两周期闭环供应链系统,在两种竞争模式(具有专利授权机制的竞争模式以及无专利授权机制的竞争模式)以及合作模式下探讨了制造商和再制造商的最优博弈策略。运用逆向归纳法推导和比较三种决策模式下的产品价格,给出再制造商从事回收再制造的临界条件,结合数值算例分析消费者偏好对均衡解及渠道成员利润的影响。研究表明:(1)从环境绩效的角度分析,无专利授权竞争模式下的回收率最高,其次是合作模式,最低是具有专利授权的竞争模式,三种模式下的旧产品回收率均随消费者偏好的增加而增加;(2)从渠道效率的角度分析,合作模式下的闭环供应链系统总利润最高,其次是具有专利授权的竞争模式,最低的是无专利授权竞争模式。无专利授权竞争模式下的渠道总利润随消费者偏好的增加而减少,其他两种模式下的渠道总利润随消费者偏好的增加而增加;(3)从原始制造商的角度分析,当其可利用再制造专利授权机制保障自身利益时,并无动机与再制造商进行合作;相反,当制造商不具备专利授权保障时,其愿意与再制造商合作,但再制造商利润又将比合作前受损,因此需提供合理的契约机制确保合作模式的有效实施。本文研究结论可为现实中制造商合理选择与再制造商的竞争与合作策略提供理论支持。

In s closed-loop supply chain（CLSC）with collection and remanufacturing of old products,how to deal with the competitive threat from the external remanufacturer is an important issue for the original equipment manufacturer（OEM）.For a two-period CLSC system comprised of an OEM and an independent remanufacturer,the optimal game strategies of both parties are discussed under three different decision structures：two types of competitive mode（competition with remanufacturing patent licensing and competition without remanufacturing patent licensing）and cooperative mode.In all three modes,the OEM produces and sells the new products in the first period.For the competitive mode with patent licensing,the remanufacturer collects and remanufactures the EOL products after the OEM＇s patent authorization in the second period,and then sells them in the market competing with the OEM.Otherwise,under the competitive mode without patent licensing,the remanufacturer can engage in these activities without the OEM＇s authorization.For the cooperative mode,the remanufacturer transfers the remanufactured products to the OEM,and then the OEM sells the two kinds of products simultaneously.Backward deduction method is used to derive and compare the optimal prices under the above three modes.The condition under which the remanufacturer engages in collection and remanufacturing is given.The impact of consumer preference for the remanufactured products on the equilibrium solutions and the profits of channel members are analyzed combined with numerical examples.The results show that：（1）From the perspective of environmental performance,the collection rate under the competitive mode without patent licensing is the highest,and then is the cooperative mode,the lowest is the competitive mode with patent licensing.The collection rates under all three modes increase in the consumer preference.（2）From the perspective of channel efficiency,the cooperative mode yields the highest system profit,and then is the competitive mode with patent licensing,the worst is the competitive mode without patent licensing.The total system profit under the competitive mode without patent licensing decreases in the consumer preference,whereas increases in the consumer preference in two other modes.（3）From the perspective of the OEM,he has no motive to cooperate with the remanufacturer if he can take advantage of the patent licensing mechanism to guarantee his own interest.On the contrary,he prefers to cooperate with the remanufacturer without patent licensing,but which meanwhile leads to the profit loss of the remanufacturer.So the reasonable contact should be provided to ensure the operations the cooperative mode.The conclusion of this paper can provide theoretical supports for the OEM to select reasonable competitive strategies or cooperative strategies with the remanufacturer in reality.