我国农村土地流转中利益主体的进化博弈分析

The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Interests Bodies During the Transfer of Rural Land in China

笔者运用进化博弈方法,分析了在农村土地流转中中央政府、地方政府和农民三者之间的利益博弈问题,得到其进化稳定策略,并利用数值模拟进行了验证。结果表明,作为农村土地流转政策的制定者,中央政府在农村土地流转中发挥主导作用;作为中央政府土地政策的具体落实者和执行者,地方政府在农村土地流转中发挥推动作用;在推进农村土地流转方面,中央政府和地方政府的目标具有一致性。

Based on evolutionary game, the thesis discusses the interests game among interests bodies including central government, local government and farmers during the transfer of rnral land. The thesis obtains the ESS and verifies the results by numerical simula- tion. The results are as follows ： As the policies maker, central government plays a leading role during the transfer of rural land. As the specific executor, local government plays a promoting role during the transfer of rural land. There is target consistency between central government and local government on promoting the transfer of rnral land.