产品众筹中逆向选择和道德风险规制问题研究

在互联网众筹平台上,由于项目发起人和投资者之间存在着信息不对称问题,一方面使得发起人因不了解投资者对众筹产品偏好的高低而带来逆向选择。针对这一问题,发起人可以通过差别设计产品质量和价格最优契约,从而达到投资者自我揭示的目的,以减少信息租金的支出,赢得更多资金支持,提高项目收益。另一方面,使得投资者参与众筹后往往无法约束或控制发起人提供产品的质量、交付日期,这就给发起人提供了低质量产品动机。解决这一问题,可以从产业组织理论视角研究这种具有"一次性购够买"属性的产品众筹中发起人的道德风险问题,并从产品价格制定和调整投资者信息结构角度给出相关规制办法。

On the platform of Crowdfunding, information asymmetry between initiators and investors can cause two problems. On one hand, initiators may make a reverse choice because of the lack of knowledge of the preference level of investors to crowd- funding products. To address this problem, initiators can differentiate the quality of products and optimize their prices to let investors self-expose as to reduce the expense of information rent, win more funding and raise the earnings of project. On the other hand, investors cannot restrain or control the quality and the deadline of products provided by initiators after they participate in crowdfunding, which will motivate initiator to provide low-quality products. To solve this problem, the ethic risk problem of initiators of crowdfunding, whose products have ＂one-time-purchase＂ attribute, may be studied from the prospect of industrial organization theory, and some policies regarding product price making and the adjustment of the in- formation structure of investors need to be launched.