配额信息不对称时排放依赖型供应链契约

Contract for Emission-Dependent Supply Chain with Asymmetric Permits Information

排放依赖型供应链中,占主导地位的排放权供应商首先决定排放权价格,生产商在观察到排放权供应商的价格决策之后做出排放交易量及生产数量决策。当生产商的排放配额信息不对称时,对称信息下的排放交易量购买契约不再协调,排放权供应商提出新的排放交易量契约,并与对称信息下的最优决策进行比较,提出了生产商排放配额信息的价值。最后,运用数值实验对模型的有效性进行了检验。

Assume that the dominated emission permit supplier determined emission price first and then the manufacturer made permits purchasing and production quantity decisions in an emission-dependent supply chain, we develop a new emission permit contract for the permit supplier to keep coordination when permit information owned only by manufacturer and compare the two different scenarios under symmetric and asymmetric information. The results indicate that the permit information is valuable for the supply chain and a numerical test is conducted to illustrate the validity of the analysis.