基于博弈视角的OTA佣金模式分析

The Analysis of OTA Commission Mode Based on the Game Theory View

在电子商务和移动商务背景下,酒店业的佣金问题引发诸多矛盾,以携程为代表的OTA佣金模式受到越来越多的挑战。本文基于酒店和OTA之间的佣金模式建立了酒店占主导地位的斯坦科尔伯格(Stackelberg)动态博弈模型以及优化的合作博弈模型,通过进一步的求解和数值分析,分别给出了酒店和OTA在非合作和合作情形下佣金的合理范围。

Under the background of e-commerce and mobile commerce, the commission problem leading to many contradictions in the hospitality industry and the OTA's commission model has received more and more challenges(represented by Ctrip). In this paper, based on this commission mode between hotel and OTA, the author established the hotel dominant Stackelberg dynamic game model and the optimization model of cooperation. By solving the model and numerical analysis, the paper concluded respectively the reasonable range when hotel and OTA took the non-cooperate strategy and cooperate strategy.According to the results of numerical analysis, the author draw the following conclusions:(1) With the improvement of the hotel direct proportion, hotel needs to increase the commission to compensate the OTA's losses caused by hotel's direct competition.(2) In the hotel dominant market, when the direct proportion is very low, the OTA, in order to get more hotel resources, needs to pay commission to hotel in which situation the commission is equivalent to the wholesale price.(3) When the relationship between the hotel and OTA shifts from competition to cooperation, the hotel needs to transfer partial interest to OTA for cooperation by improving commission.