基于累积前景理论的联盟企业知识转移演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Knowledge Transfer in Industry Alliance Based on Cumulative Prospect Theory

知识转移过程是一个复杂的博弈过程,演化博弈论可以很好地解释转移主体行为。考虑到传统的演化博弈模型不能对知识转移主体非理性心理因素及风险偏好问题进行有效解释,本文将累积前景理论与演化博弈相结合,运用前景价值函数完善支付矩阵的部分参数,分析博弈模型的演化稳定策略。通过仿真模拟得出如下结论:知识转移存在两个演化稳定策略;转移策略由直接收益、转移成本及前景损益等因素决定;转移方的风险损失对转移策略影响较大,而接收方潜在收入对知识转移策略影响较小。

The process of knowledge transfer is a complicated course of playing chess. Evolutionary game theory is a good way to explain behaviors of knowledge transfer actor. Considering that the evolutionary game has limita- tion in explaining the irrational factors and risk preference of knowledge transfer actor, prospect theory is integrat- ed into evolutionary game theory in this study. A prospect value function is used to improve partial parameter in payoff？ matrix to analyze the evolutionary stable strategy. The result shows that there are two evolutionary stable strategies in knowledge transfer process. Transfer policy is determined by the direct incomes, the cost of knowl- edge transfer, prospect profit and loss. Risk losses have larger influence on transfer policy for suppliers, while potential earnings have less influence on transfer policy for recipients.