谁签订的薪酬契约? 签约方身份与会计信息的契约作用——来自中国地方国有上市公司的证据

Who Sign the Compensation Contract? Nature of Contracting Parties and Contracting Role of Accounting Information——Evidence from China's Local SOEs

本文以地方国有上市公司为样本,研究薪酬契约签约方身份对会计信息契约作用的影响。研究发现,地方国有上市公司的管理者薪酬与会计业绩具有显著的正相关关系。并且,相对于控股股东委托董事会与总经理签约,当控股股东直接与董事长签约时,薪酬契约对会计信息的需求更大,会计信息的契约作用更强。进一步地,相对于企业性质的控股股东与董事长签约,行政性质的控股股东与董事长签约下薪酬契约对会计信息的需求更大,会计信息的契约作用更强。本文的结论表明,我国地方国有上市公司的薪酬契约是有效的,而签约方身份的不同会影响薪酬契约对会计信息的需求。

This paper investigates how different nature of contracting parties affect contracting role of accounting information in compensation contracts of China's local state-owned enterprises( SOEs). This paper finds that relation between pay and performance in compensation contracts of local SOEs are significantly positive. When compared with the contracts signed by board and CEO,the contracting role of accounting information is stronger in contracts signed by controlling shareholder and chair of the board. Further,the demand for accounting information in compensation contracts is even higher when the controlling shareholder is government. This paper points out different nature of contracting parties indeed affect contracting role of accounting information in compensation contracts.