民用技术转军用定价机制分析

Pricing Mechanism of Technology Transfer from Civil Sector to Military Sector

为解决民用技术转军用时如何定价的问题,基于讨价还价模型分析框架,建立不完全信息条件下线性报价模型。在模型设立时将预期成本和预期价值的分布拓展为一般的均匀分布,得出均衡价格和成交条件表达式。在此基础上分析均衡价格的影响因素和不完全信息对均衡价格和成交效率的影响,并结合实例进行了分析。研究发现:除剩余分配率、技术对军方价值、技术转移成本外,预期成本下限和预期价值上限也是均衡价格的重要决定因素;不完全信息会降低市场成交效率并对均衡价格产生不确定性影响;预期成本下限的提高会提高成交效率,预期价值上限的提高会降低成交效率。打破了不完全信息必将造成均衡价格下降的传统看法,也为加强军民信息沟通的政策实践提供了理论支撑。

According to its feature, a linear bilateral auction model with incomplete information is constructed based on bargaining model to solve the problem of pricing technology when it is transferred from civil sector to military sector. The expected cost and expected value are set for the general uniform distribution and obtain the expression of equilibrium price and closing condition. On this basis, the factor of equilibrium price and impact of incomplete information to equilibrium price and the efficiency of market transactions are analyzed with an example. The result shows except for the remaining allocation rate, the value of technology for the military and the technology transfer cost, the lower limit of expected cost and the upper limit of expected value are also important determinants of the equilibrium price. Incomplete information will reduce the efficiency of market transactions and create uncertainty affect on the equilibrium price. It breaks the view some scholars believe that incomplete information will inevitably lead to a lower price. It also found that the increase of the expected cost lower limit will improve transaction efficiency and the increase of the expected value upper limit will reduce the efficiency of the transaction. Therefore, good communication between military and civil sides is important to improve transaction efficiency.