空间“邻近效应”与地方政府住房限购政策的实施

The Spatial Neighborhood Effects and the Implementation of Housing Purchase Restriction Policy of Local Governments

本文对我国地方政府住房限购政策的实施机制进行了研究。理论分析表明:地方政府住房限购政策强度存在空间上的相互作用,即空间"邻近效应"。对某一地方政府而言,与其邻近区域地方政府的平均限购强度越高,那么该地方政府的限购强度也越高;另一方面,中央政府对地方政府限购单位奖励水平越高、地方政府单位限购成本越低,地方政府的限购强度越大。在此基础上,利用2011—2013年我国限购城市面板数据进行的实证检验表明,不同地方政府间的住房限购强度存在显著的正向"邻近效应",该结论在考虑"邻近效应"不同计算方式和剔除一线城市样本后的稳健性检验中也是成立的。因此,地方政府间的"邻近效应"在我国住房限购政策实施中起到了重要作用。

This paper analyzes the mechanism in the implementation of housing purchase restric- tion policy of local governments. The theoretical analysis shows that there exist spatial interac- tions between local governments in the housing purchase restriction. And the local governments tend to have tighter housing restriction policy when the average housing restriction strengths of their neighborhoods are strong. Meanwhile, local governmets which receive more rewards from central government and have less policy costs are more likely to implement tighter housing re- striction policy. Then this paper conducts an empirical analysis using the panel data of China＇s large and medium-sized cities from 2011 to 2013 and the results support the existence of neighborhood effects. Besides, the conclusion is also confirmed in the further robust tests con- sidering different samples and calculations of neighborhoods effects. Therefore, the neighbor- hood effects play an important role in the implementation of local government housing purchase restriction policy.