摘要
中介性质的供应链金融平台,创建与客户利益有效协调的佣金定价机制至关重要。本文运用鲁宾斯轮流讨价还价博弈思想,以债权融资业务为背景,构建了信息不对称情况下供应链金融中介平台与客户关于佣金决策的讨价还价博弈模型。通过博弈分析得出了平台的最优佣金定价机制,按此佣金定价,可实现平台与客户利益的合理权衡。最后,对平台的定价机制进行了算例验证。
As an intermediary supply chain financial platform,it is essential to establish an effective commission pricing mechanism to coordinate the interests with the customers.Based on the concept of Rubens bargaining game and the background of creditor's rights financing business,this paper constructs the bargaining game model of the supply chain financial intermediary platform and the client on the commission decision under the condition of asymmetric information.Through the game analysis,we get the optimal pricing mechanism of the platform,and a reasonable weighing of interests between the platform and the customers can be achieved according to the commission pricing.Finally,an example is given to verify the pricing mechanism of the platform.
出处
《工业技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第4期55-61,共7页
Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基金
国家自然基金"供应链金融平台的信用创造机制及其微观效应研究"(项目编号:71571074)
关键词
供应链金融平台
中介
利益权衡
讨价还价博弈
逆向回归
supply chain finance platform
intermediary
interest weighing
bargaining game
inverse regression