互联网众筹平台监管策略的演化博弈分析

An Analysis of the Evolutionary Game of Supervisory Strategies for Internet Crowd-Funding Platforms

在互联网众筹市场中,由于项目发起人和消费者之间存在事前信息不对称,导致消费者在选择投资项目的过程中面临较大的风险;而作为中介的众筹平台,对发起人监督机制下的惩罚效用可以有效地规避此类问题。运用演化博弈理论分析了互联网众筹中,具有有限理性的众筹平台和项目发起人策略选择的互动机制,得出如下结论:在不考虑平台和发起人受外界声誉激励时,众筹平台的监管惩罚力度越大,发起人策略演化趋于如实揭示策略的可能性越大;项目发起人欺骗的程度越大,众筹平台策略演化趋于监管策略的可能性越大。反之,消费者资金安全问题将由平台承担其损失。有效实施监管,运用不同程度的惩罚策略,可以有效规制众筹平台项目发起人隐藏产品信息欺骗消费者的行为,引导发起人如实揭示项目类型,减少信息不对称带来的逆向选择,提高消费者参与众筹的积极性。

In the online financing crowd-funding market, the consumers are faced with greaterrisks when selecting investment projects due to the asymmetry information between the project spon- sors and the consumers. While the crowd-funding platform as the intermediary can avoid such prob- lems effectively with its punishment effects under the sponsor supervision mechanism. This paper em- ploys the evolutionary game theory to analyze the interactive mechanism between the crowd-funding platform with bounded rationality and the project sponsors＇ strategic selection in the intemet crowd-funding. The findings are as follows： when the platform and the sponsors＇ incentive from out- side reputation are not taken into consideration, the heavier the supervision punishment by the crowd-funding, the greater the possibility that the sponsors＇ strategic evolution will tend to be re- vealing the truth; otherwise, the greater the sponsors＇ deceitful degree, the greater the possibility that the crowd-funding strategic evolution will tend to be the supervision strategy; while the safety of the consumers＇ funds will be the responsibility of the platform. Therefore, effective implementation of the supervision and application of the punishment strategy of different degrees can regulate effectively the behaviors of concealing the product information to deceive consumers by the project sponsors, lead the sponsors to reveal the true projects, reduce the adverse selection resulted from asymmetric in- formation, and raise the consumers＇ enthusiasm to participate the crowd-funding.