金融举报者激励和反报复保护法律制度研究——以美国萨班斯法和多德-弗兰克法为核心

Research on the Legal System of Incentives and Anti-retaliation Protection of Financial Whistleblower:From the Aspect of SOX and Dodd-Frank Act

金融违法违规行为由于其固有的复杂性和隐蔽性,对其的有效发现一直都是世界性难题。美国学界研究表明金融举报在发现公司违法违规行为中的作用居于首位,监管机构自己主动发现的作用居于末位,甚至低于审计师和媒体。美国从萨班斯法到多德-弗兰克华尔街改革及消费者保护法,一直围绕着金融举报者奖励和反报复保护两大制度进行不断的构建和升级完善。我国金融举报者制度的规定聊胜于无,激励和反报复保护核心制度的缺位乏力注定了该制度沦为一纸空壳,由此带来的金融违法违规发现机制的孱弱和执法力度的疲软也放纵了我国各种金融乱象丛生,在此时代背景下建构并全面提升我国的金融举报者激励和反报复制度迫在眉睫。

Because of its inherent complexity and concealment,financial illegal behavior has always been a worldwide problem. The research shows that the financial whistleblower plays the most important role in the discovery of company illegal behavior. From the SOX to Dodd-Frank Act,The United States has been constructed and upgraded its legal system of incentives and anti-retaliation protection of financial whistleblower. The absence of incentives and anti-retaliation protection has reduced the legal system of financial whistleblower in China. It results in the weakness of financial illegal discovery mechanism and law enforcement,and also indulges China’s various financial chaos. In the context of this background,it is urgent to construct and improve the financial whistleblower incentives and anti-retaliation System in our country.