摘要
本文选用2008~2010年应用过衍生品的沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,检验企业在应用衍生品过程中的投机行为与管理层认知偏差之间的相关性。结果表明:管理层的认知偏差会导致企业在应用衍生品时实施投机行为;但在企业快速增长时,管理层可能会因为认识到自身认知偏差的缺陷而变得相对谨慎,从而抑制企业的衍生品投机行为。此外,证据还表明:更多的样本公司应用衍生品是为了套期保值,但投机行为也很显著;在管理层认知偏差更大的情况下,企业应用衍生品的行为就会从套保转化为投机。
Based on a sample from Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2010 which have applied derivatives, we test the relevance between speculation and cognition biases. It can be found that: cognition biases might lead managers to engage in speculation by derivatives; however, the quicker the company grows, the less speculation there is as managers become more conservative because of cognition biases. Additionally, there is a very significant speculation in the sample although more companies use derivatives for hedging; it might be cognition biases that convert hedging to speculation; the speculation is main to realize the interest of managers.
出处
《财务研究》
2017年第2期59-67,共9页
Finance Research
基金
中国博士后基金资助面上项目(20100471422)
关键词
衍生品
投机行为
认知偏差
快速增长
derivatives
speculation
cognition biases
quick growth