所有制、迁移成本与环境管制--来自重庆微观企业的经验证据

Ownership,Moving Cost and Environmental Regulation——Evidence from Firm-Level Data in Chongqing

在治理环境问题过程中,如何规避环境联邦主义恶果,协调利益冲突是中国政府面临的重大挑战。在地区竞争的理论框架下,本文检验了所有制和迁移成本对环境管制的影响。一方面,地区竞争促使地方政府为了吸引资本流入而降低环境管制标准。特别地,外资企业在招商引资中具有正的"外部性",这弱化了环保部门对外资企业的管制力度。另一方面,环境管制需不妨碍地区经济增长的要求使得地方环保部门的执法行为颇具选择性,试图经由选择性执法来凸显环境政绩。利用重庆市工业企业数据,本文研究发现:在控制其他因素后,就环境行政罚款概率而言,外资企业比私营企业低3.5个百分点;企业迁移成本越大,被处罚的概率越大。上述实证结果表明,在实践中,重庆市环境管制表现出"竞次"的结果。同时,企业迁移成本已成为环保部门选择性执法的重要参考指标。

Under regional competition theoretical framework, this paper examines the effects of ownership and moving cost on environmental regulation in China. Employing a unique firm-level dataset from Environmental Protection Bureau in Chongqing and Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database, we find that, as other equals, foreign firms have lower probabilities of being fined than private firms, and those firms who are less mobile, are more likely to he regulated. These results provide direct empirical evidence that for Chongqing city, interregional competition results in a ＂race to the bottom＂. Meanwhile, local environmental protection bureaus carry out strict regulation with firms who have large moving cost.