安全生产服务市场中逆向选择的信号博弈

Signaling Game on Adverse Selection in Work-safety-service Market

为解决安全生产服务市场中由信息不对称所造成的逆向选择问题,文章分析了逆向选择的发生机理,构建了企业与安全生产服务机构之间不完全信息动态博弈模型,提出设计一个有成本的信号,通过调节信号传递成本实现安全生产服务市场的有效分离均衡。研究发现:信号传递成本因安全生产服务机构类型不同而存在差异是安全生产服务市场能够产生分离均衡的前提;当且仅当不同类型安全生产服务机构的信号传递总成本控制在特定的分离区间时,安全生产服务市场才能够出现唯一有效的分离均衡。

In order to solve the adverse selection problem caused by information asymmetry in work-safety-service market, the evolution of the adverse selection is analyzed and a dynamic game model with incomplete information between enterprises and work-safety-service organizations is proposed in the paper. A signal with cost is brought up and an effective separating equilibri- um in the market can be achieved through altering signal transmission cost. It is shown that differentiation of transmission costs between different kinds of organizations is the premise of separating equilibrium; the unique effective separating equilibrium can be achieved only when signal transmission costs of different kinds of organizations are set in separating specific intervals.