基于双边过度自信的多任务委托代理模型研究

Research of Multitask Principal-agent Model Based on Bilateral Overconfidence

借鉴因决策者过度自信而导致众多知名企业"大起大落"的案例经验,同时考虑我国国有企业的经济与社会的多任务要求,在传统多任务委托代理模型的基础上,突破以往经济学的完全理性人假设,在所有决策人都有过度自信倾向的现实背景下,引入委托人与代理人的双边过度自信特征,求解并分析了在此情境中次优与最优规则下的契约设计。与以往单任务单过度自信的结论不同的是,当委托人与代理人对一项及两项任务的有利环境拥有较高过度自信时,代理人会产生高激励期望与高努力对应委托人的低激励与低努力认可;当双方对不利环境拥有较强过度自信时,委托人会提供高激励与高努力期望对应代理人的低努力与低可接受激励。

By referring to the cases of many renown enterprises’ ups and downs due to decision makers’ overconfidence and considering the economic and social missions of the state-owned enterprises（SOEs）,this paper breaks the hypothesis of perfectly rational man based on the traditional multi-task principal-agent model.Under the background that all decision makers are overconfident,the bilateral overconfidence of principal and agent was introduced and the subprime and the optimal contract design in this situation was analyzed.Results indicate that compared with the conclusion of single-task and single-person overconfidence,the agent will have higher incentive and endeavor expectations while the principal will have lower incentive and endeavor acceptance when the principal and agent have higher overconfidence in the enabling environment of single or double tasks.However,when the principal and agent have more overconfidence in the adverse environment,the principal will provide higher incentive and endeavor expectations while the agent provides lower endeavor and incentive acceptance.