集群新创企业与在位企业搜索时机互动的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Search Timing Interaction Between New Ventures and Incumbent Firms in Cluster

集群新创企业与在位企业围绕搜索时机进行博弈,以往研究局限于市场进入次序或新产品导入速度,并且没有揭示集群新创企业搜索时机的重复选择机制及动态演进规律,为此文章就新创企业多阶段竞争下的"搜索-反应"问题构建搜索时机选择的重复博弈模型与演化路径。研究发现:集群新创企业领先搜索或跟随搜索策略选择,与搜索风险、搜索获益,以及搜索成本三者密切相关;重复博弈中,若在位企业选择领先搜索的收益高于跟随搜索的收益,集群新创企业交替选择跟随搜索与领先搜索为最佳博弈策略;系统演化的长期均衡结果可能是领先搜索或跟随搜索。演化博弈仿真结果表明,最终演进路径及收敛情况与博弈的支付和博弈发生的初始状态相关。

New ventures in cluster and incumbent firms game around search timing. The preresearch was limited to the order of market entry or new product tritroduction speed, and failed to repeated selection mechanism and dynamic evolution law of search timing for new venturesTherefore,this paper builds a repeated game model and evolution path of search timing selection for“ search-response” problem under multi-stage competition of new ventures. The results are as follows. Firstly,whether new ventures select leading search or following search strategy depends on risk, return and cost of searching. Secondly, n the repeated game,if the revenue of leading search which tncumbentfirms choose is higher than that of following search, new ventures will intermittently choose followingsearch and leading search. Thirdly, the long-term equilibrium simulation resutt of evolution system may be leading search or following search. The simulation resutt of evolutionary game shows the final evolution path and convergence are determined by the payment of the game and the initial state of the game.