摘要
要使信念和其他命题态度语境的量化有意义,存在两个大的困难。一个是所指称的对象可能不存在;另一个是共指称词项的替换性原则可能会在这样的语境下被破坏。我将在本文中论证,第一个问题可以通过如下方式解决:将信念对象看成是一类实体,这种实体不管它是否存在,都可以被指称。我将概述一种存在物的理论来使其可行。此外,我将论证,指示性指称本身不是直接指称;而且,当所涉及的共指称的两个词项都以直接指称的方式使用时,不存在替换性问题。
There are two big obstacles to making sense of quantification into belief and other propositional attitude contexts: one that the object referred to may not exist, the other that the principle of substitutivity of co-referential terms breaks down in such contexts. I shall argue in this paper that the first problem can be solved by recognizing objects of belief as entities that can be referred to regardless of whether they exist, and I shall sketch a theory of existentials that makes this plausible. In addition I shall argue that demonstrative reference is not in itself direct reference, and I shall argue that there is no problem of substitutivity when the co-referential terms in question are both used directly referentially.
出处
《逻辑学研究》
CSSCI
2017年第1期128-149,共22页
Studies in Logic