策略性等待下Y型瓶颈的单步拥堵收费模型

The single-step congestion toll model of Y-shaped bottleneck under tactical waiting

本文针对包含至少一个上游瓶颈路段和一个共用的下游瓶颈路段的Y型交通路网,研究了策略性等待单步收费条件下早高峰期间通勤者的出行行为和最优道路拥挤收费方案。基于出行者的出发时间选择遵循用户均衡准则的假设,推导出了不同汇合规则下用户均衡的流入率和个人出行成本。依据出行者的出发时间选择规律,进一步推导出了最优的道路拥挤收费时段和费率。研究发现,策略性等待单步收费可以有效降低交通网络的系统总阻抗,但可能会增加出行者的个人出行成本。此外,还发现收费的有效性不但与汇合规则有关,还取决于上下游瓶颈路段通行能力的相对大小。该研究验证了Y型交通路网上存在Braess诡异现象,即扩大上游路段的瓶颈通行能力可能会引起系统总出行成本的增加。

In this paper, according to the Y-shaped traffic network containing at least one upstream bottleneck and a common downstream bottleneck, the departure time choice behavior and the optimal road congestion pricing scheme during morning peak hours were investigated under tactical waiting and single step toll. Based on the assumption that the departure time choice followed the user equilibrium （UE） principle, the equilibrium departure rate and individual trip cost under different merging rules were derived. According to the departure time choice behavior, the optimal road congestion charging period and toll level were further derived. Research showed that the proposed pricing scheme could effectively decrease the total congestion of the traffic network system, however, it might lead to the increase in individual trip cost. In addition, it also found that the effectiveness of the proposed pricing scheme not only depended on the merging rules, but also depended on the relative magnitudes of the capacities of the upstream and downstream bottlenecks. Finally, the results showed that there was Braess paradox in the Y-shaped traffic network, which meant that the total system travel cost could be increased when the capacity of the upstream bottleneck was increased.