政治关联与公司现金持有:融资约束还是代理冲突——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据

Political Connection and Corporate Cash Holdings:Financial Constraints or Agency Conflicts?Evidence from China individual-controlled listed firms

政治关联是世界各国普遍存在的一种非正式制度安排。特别是在我国当前市场化程度不高、法律制度和金融体系不够健全的制度环境下,政府在经济金融资源配置中仍然占据主导地位。民营企业为了获取更多的资源,积极地寻求并建立与政府之间的联系。然而,政治关联在给企业带来融资便利,缓解企业融资约束,进而弱化企业现金持有的预防性和交易成本动机(即政治关联的融资约束效应)的同时,也可能会加剧企业的代理问题,从而强化企业现金持有的代理动机(即政治关联的代理冲突效应)。那么,政治关联对民营企业的现金持有决策究竟会产生怎样的影响?本文选取2005年至2012年间沪深A股民营上市公司为研究样本,考察政治关联对民营企业现金持有水平的影响。实证研究表明,政治关联民营企业比非关联企业持有相对较少的现金,而且民营企业的政治关联程度越高,现金持有水平越低。进一步的研究发现,上述实证结果是源于政治关联的融资约束效应,而非代理冲突效应。研究结论的启示在于:其一,企业融资决策不能单纯考虑自身的财务因素,也要兼顾制度环境因素;其二,若要从根本上解决民营企业融资难问题,应当为民营企业提供完善的市场化制度安排。

Political connection is an informal system commonly existing in the world. Especially in China, the Govern- ment plays an important role in resource allocation. In order to obtain more resources, individual-controlled firms always seek to build political connection with the Government. Although the political connection could ease firms＇ financial con straints and weaken the motivation for holding cash, it could also intensify their agency problems and strengthen the motiva- tion for holding cash. Based on the sample of individual-controlled firms listed with initial public offering from 2005 to 2012 in Chinese capital markets, this paper examines the impact of political connection on corporate cash holdings. The empirical results show that politically connected firms hold less cash than their non-connected peers, and the higher degree of political connection, the lower level of corporate cash holdings. In additional analyses, we find that the results above are attributed to the effect of financial constraints rather than the effect of agency conflicts. The conclusions above deepen the understanding of the influence of political connection on firms＇ financial policy. Some policy implications are suggested.