大股东监督、高管激励和薪酬业绩敏感度——基于股权分置改革研究

Large Shareholders' Monitoring and Top management' Pay-Performance Sensitivity——Based on Non-tradable Share Reform

中国上市公司大股东侵占小股东利益的现象(侵占效应)较为普遍。股权分置改革使得大小股东利益趋同,有利于降低代理成本,促使大股东有更强的动机监督和激励高管。基于股权分置改革的拟自然实验,缓解以往研究的内生性问题,本文发现股权分置改革后非国有企业的高管薪酬业绩敏感度显著提高。同时,本文发现只有在公司治理结构完善的公司,该积极作用才能显现出来。此外,由于国有股流通限制、政府薪酬管制以及高管政治追求等因素,本文并没有发现在股权分置改革后国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感度有显著改善。

The phenomenon of large shareholders＇ tunneling of minority shareholders＇ interests in Chinese listed companies is very common. The non-tradable share reform aligns the interests of large and minority shareholders, which helps to reduce the agency cost and encourage large shareholders to supervise and motivate the executives. Based on the quasi-natural experiment of the non-tradable share reform, this paper finds that the convergence of the interests of large and minority shareholders improves the pay-performance sensitivity in non-state-owned enterprises. In the same time, this paper finds that the positive effect can only be revealed when the company has strong corporate governance mechanism. In addition, this paper does not find significant improvement in pay-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises＇ after the reform, due to the restriction of state-owned shares tradability, salary restriction and executives＇ political pursuit.