分析师关注度,会计稳健性与过度投资

Analyst coverage、Accounting Conservatism and Over-investment

利用中国A股上市公司2005—2015年的数据,从代理成本和融资约束的角度,文章考察了分析师关注度对过度投资行为的影响,发现分析师并不能充分保持独立性,发挥监管作用,反而使过度投资问题更严重了,考虑会计稳健性的调节作用之后也并没有使之改善,反而助推了管理者与分析师的合谋行为,增加了过度投资。通过对规模效应的考察发现,分析师关注通过缓解小公司的融资约束,增加了过度投资;分析师关注通过降低大公司的代理成本,减少了过度投资。

The research on analyst coverage and over-investment are based on China＇s a-share listed companies from 2005 to2015.In the perspective of agency costs and financing constraints, it argues that the analysts are not fully independent, they make over-investment problem more seriously in spite of playing the role of regulation. Then considering the role of accounting conservatism, however, it is not improving, leading to more investment activities. Based on the investigation of the scale effect, analyst coverage alleviates the financing constraints in small companies, resulting in the excessive investment,yet it reduces the agency costs in large companies, lowering the excessive investment.