摘要
在私募股权投资基金机构与被投资餐饮企业投融资的过程中,出于自身利益最大化原则考虑,被投资的餐饮企业会为追求自身利益最大化而做出最优于自己的决策,甚至可能会出现违约等行为.与此同时,私募基金机构会根据投融资过程中被投资餐饮企业的行为决策选择是否在下一个投资周期内对该餐饮企业进行再投资或资本退出.基于以上思路,本文利用博弈论和案例分析的思想,从理论上探索了私募基金机构和被投资餐饮企业在再投资和资本退出选择上的博弈.
In the process of investment and financing among Private Equity funds (“ PE” for short) institutions and the catering enterprises,consider of its own benefit maximization principle,the invested catering enterprises will make decisions to get maximization self-interests,even may appear default behavior.At the same time,According to the invested catering enterprises in the process of investment and financing behavior,the private equity institutions decide to choose invest in the next investment cycle of the catering enterprises to exit investments.Based on the above ideas,this paper uses the ideas of game theory and case analysis,explores the private equity institutions and the invested catering enterprises in the game of reinvesting and capital exit theoretically.
出处
《山东师范大学学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
2017年第1期17-21,共5页
Journal of Shandong Normal University(Natural Science)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(61170038
61472231
61502283)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12YJA630152)
山东省社会科学基金资助项目(11CGLJ22)
济南市高校自主创新计划项目(201401202)
关键词
私募基金
博弈
餐饮业
投资
private equity
game
catering
investment