融资约束、高管薪酬与企业绩效

Financing Constraints,Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance

本文以国有A股上市公司为研究对象,分析融资约束情境下高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性。研究结论表明:融资约束对高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性具有显著影响;高融资约束的企业,高管薪酬与企业绩效具有显著的正相关性,低融资约束的企业,高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性不显著;另外,融资约束对高管薪酬与企业绩效相关性的影响随行业的不同也有所不同。

The studies have found that the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance is affected by a lot of situational factors. Financing constraints will affect corporate performance by restricting enterprise principal-agent behavior,which is the important situational factor affecting the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance. This paper's research object is the state-owned listed companies and the paper will analyze the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance when facing financing constraints. The results show:Firstly,the financing constraints have a significant influence on correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance. Secondly,the correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance is significant positive when the enterprise in high financing constraints,but when the enterprise in low financing constraints,the correlation is not significant. In addition,when the enterprises belong to different industries,the affects of financing constraints on correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance is different.