模块副现象论与自由意志危机

Modual Epiphenomenalism and the Crisis for Free Will

随着意志科学研究的不断深入,科学家们对意志实现的神经基础的物理构成、行为模式与活动机制有了愈加透彻的理解。Wegner采用现象学策略,区分出经验意志现象和现象意志现象,基于这两种现象的耦合程度,提出显明因果理论,结果把有意识意志视为没有真实因果作用的解释性虚构,提出模块副现象论。大多哲学家把模块副现象论视为科学对自由意志的严重威胁。除了从技术上批判李贝特行动实验有数据幻觉误导之嫌外,他们更多地是通过对自由意志的概念剖析来否认其科学证据的合法性。Tim认为人类的认知结构特点阻碍了我们对自由意志的把握,这一永恒的哲学命题缺乏认识论切入的可能性,只能存在于纯形而上学思辨之中,也不适用于科学研究。

In process of persistent further investigation of will science, scientists have obtained much more penetrating understanding of some characteris- tics of the realization of free will such as constituents of the physical basis of neurons, act patterns of freedom and operative mechanism. Wegner makes a phenomenological distinction between experimental will and phenomenological will and examines the degree of the matching of both above, and then propo- ses apparent causation theory which would be induced into modual epiphenomenalism. Conscious will, therefore, has been viewed as an explanatory con- fabulation without genuine causal powers, resulting in a scientifical crisis for free will. Apart from the criticisms from the misguide of the illusion of data, philosophers highlight the analysis of the concept of free will by which the legitimacy of scientifical evidences of conscious illusion has been defied. Tim claims that the features of our cognitive architecture prevent us from possessing free will. According to him, the real concept of free will can only beheld in the contemplation of metaphysics because free will could not be an object for scientific study due to the lack of possibility for epistemology.