银行贷款对企业风险承担的影响:推动还是抑制?

How does Bank Loan Influence Corporate Risk-Taking:Inhibit or Promote?

企业资本结构中具有负债成分会导致债权人与股东(管理者)之间发生委托代理问题,从而可能出现资产替代行为和加大财务危机的概率,并进一步影响到企业风险承担水平。本文以2004年至2013年中国上市公司为样本,实证检验银行贷款对企业风险承担的影响。研究发现,银行贷款与企业风险承担水平显著正相关。进一步深入分析发现,尽管较短的贷款期限可以抑制企业风险承担,但短期借款仍然与企业风险承担水平显著正相关。另外,当企业投资机会较多,管理者具有股权激励时,银行贷款与企业风险承担水平之间的正相关关系更加显著。研究结论说明在我国的制度背景下,银行贷款与企业风险承担水平的关系更加符合资产替代观。

In the capital structure of the enterprise,the liability component will lead to the agency problem between the creditors and shareholds(managers),which may lead to the probability of asset substitution and financial crisis and then affect the level of corporate risk-taking. Basing on the data of China's listed companies from 2004 to 2013,this paper investigates the relationship between the bank loan and corporate risk taking. We find that they are significantly positively correlated. Further tests finds that although the shorter term loans could inhabit risk-taking,the short term loans remain significantly positively correlated with corporate risk-taking. In addition,when investment opportunities increase or managers have equity incentive,the positive relation between bank loan and corporate risk is more profound. Our results show that the relationship between bank loans and corporation risk-taking is more in line with the explanation of asset substitution.