管理层权力、产权性质与公司风险承担

Managerial Power, Nature of Ownership and Corporate Risk Taking

以我国沪、深两市上市公司为研究对象,基于社会心理学的权力接近/抑制理论,研究了管理层权力如何影响公司风险承担以及上述影响在不同产权性质公司间的差异。研究表明:提高管理层权力能够引致其"行为接近系统",促使管理者更为注重风险承担的潜在收益,进而促进公司风险承担;而降低管理层权力则激发其"行为抑制系统",促使管理者将注意力转移到避免风险承担的负面产出方面,进而降低公司风险承担。而国有产权企业政治属性的嵌入弱化了管理层权力对公司风险承担的影响。

Using a corporate-level dataset of Chinese listed companies and based on the social psychology approach/inhibition theory of power, the article studied the impact of managerial power on corporate risk taking and the difference of the impact between companies about different types of ownership property. The results show that： the improvement of managerial power can cause the ＂ behavioral approach system＂ play, leading them to engage in risk taking projects as they will focus on the potential payoffs intrinsic with risk taking. While reducing the managerial power can cause the ＂ behavioral inhibition system＂ play, prompting managers to focus on avoiding negative outcomes of risk taking, which can reduce the corporate risk taking further. The political attribute in state-owned companies weakens the positive effect of managerial power on corporate risk taking.