摘要
康德一方面主张"自由意志"是"理性"难以把握的本体之物,因此无法像以往的西方哲学家们那样,通过强调"把理性知识运用于实践"的途径倡导"实践理性"的哲理精神,另一方面又宣称"纯粹理性自身就是实践的",在抽去了"理性"作为"认知能力"的核心语义后,将它直接套在了作为"欲求能力"的"意志"身上,试图由此避免"实践非理性"的结论,结果导致他的实践哲学陷入了内在的悖论,最终未能合乎理性地解答"理性"何以"实践"的关键问题。
Due to taking free-will as the thing itself which cannot be known by reason as the faculty of cognition, on the one hand, Kant could not advocate the spirit of "practical reason" by re- quiting people to apply rational knowledge to practice as many Western philosophers have done. When he held that "pure reason is practical in itself" in order to avoid the conclusion "practice is ir- rational", on the other hand, he made a logical mistake of confusing concepts by removing its cogni- tive meaning from the concept of reason and then directly imposing it on the will as the faculty of de- sire. As a result, Kant's practical philosophy falls into some in-depth paradox in theory.
出处
《南京社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第4期52-58,共7页
Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences
关键词
康德
实践理性
认知理性
自由意志
欲求能力
Kant
practical reason
cognitive reason
free-will
faculty of desire