母公司非垄断者条件下跨国公司研发模式选择研究

Research on R&D Patterns Selection of MNEs When Parent Is Non-monopoly

跨国公司面临的一个重要挑战就是如何在不同地区获得不同知识,并在自身运营中高效运用这些知识。因此,跨国公司如何选择研发模式以获得不同的知识受到越来越多的关注。针对跨国公司研发模式的选择,用博弈论构建一个母公司非垄断者条件下包括母公司、子公司及其竞争者在内的模型,用该模型分析跨国公司在集中研发和分散研发条件下的均衡产量和均衡利润。基于古诺模型构建博弈模型,关注跨国公司的研发模式,包括母公司所在市场上竞争对手的知识转移给母公司的份额、母公司的知识转移给子公司的份额、母公司的知识转移给竞争对手的份额、子公司所在市场上竞争对手的知识转移给子公司的份额、子公司的知识转移给母公司的份额等知识因素。采用MAPLE软件进行求解,通过对均衡产量与均衡利润进行比较,得到母公司非垄断者条件下跨国公司进行研发模式选择的充分条件。研究结果表明,母公司竞争对手的知识转移给母公司的份额、母公司的知识转移给子公司的份额、子公司所在市场上的产品替代率和子公司的知识转移给竞争对手的份额对集中研发模式有正向影响,对分散研发模式有负向影响;母公司所在市场上的产品替代率、母公司的知识转移给竞争对手的份额、子公司竞争对手的知识转移给子公司的份额和子公司的知识转移给母公司的份额对集中研发模式有负向影响,对分散研发模式有正向影响。研究结果意味着集中研发和分散研发的优势都受到知识因素和市场因素的影响,并不存在针对非垄断者条件下跨国公司的最好研发模式,但对于一个具体的非垄断跨国公司确实存在一个最合适的研发模式。

Recently, knowledge has been becoming more and more important for the development of enterprises, while MNEs are developing dramatically all over the world. A serious challenge faced by MNEs is how they obtain different knowledge from differ- ent areas and use the knowledge effectively in their operations. Therefore, how MNEs choose R＆D patterns is attracting more and more attention. In realistic practice, monopolistic MNEs becomes fewer and fewer due to the fierce competition. Aiming at R＆D patterns selection of MNEs, we establish a model including parent, subsidiary and their competitors with game theory when the parent is not a monopolist, and analyze equilibrium quantities and equilibrium profits of MNEs in the case of R＆D centralization and those in the case of R＆D decentralization using the model respectively. Our model is based on Cournot model, which is a classic game model usually used to analyze quantity competition. We focus the impact of R＆D pattern to MNEs＇ profits in our model that contains the proportion of knowledge of parent＇s competitor transferring to the parent, the propor- tion of knowledge of parent transferring to the subsidiary, product substituting rate in the market where subsidiary operations and the proportion of knowledge of the subsidiary transferring to its competitor, we use MAPLE to resolve our model, because hand- work of resolution of our model is quite time-consuming. After finishing resolving our model, we obtain sufficient conditions for MNEs to select R＆D pattern when the parent is not a monopolist by comparing equilibrium quantities and equilibrium profits. The analysis outcomes of our model indicate that the proportion of knowledge of parent＇s competitor transferring to the par- ent, the proportion of knowledge of parent transferring to the subsidiary, product substituting rate in the market where subsidiary operations and the proportion of knowledge of the subsidiary transferring to its competitor have positive impacts to R＆D centraliza- tion, and have negative impacts to R＆D decentralization; product substituting rate in the market where parent operations, the proportion of knowledge of parent transferring to its competitor, the proportion of knowledge of subsidiary＇s competitor transferring to the subsidiary and the proportion of knowledge of subsidiary transferring to parent have negative impacts to R＆D centralization, and have positive impacts to R＆D decentralization. The research outcomes mean the advantages both R＆D centralization and R＆D decentralization are impacted by knowledge elements and market elements. There is not the best R＆D pattern for MNEs when parent is not a monopolist all over the world, but there is a suitable R＆D pattern for a MNE when its parent is not a monopolist. This research can provide guidance for MNEs to select suitable R＆D pattern.