从基础主义到“康德式”建构主义——兼论事实与价值在契约式推理中的互契性和局限性

From Foundationalism to Kantian Constructivism: the Coherence and Limitation of Fact and Value in the Reasoning of Social Contract Theory

公平性是契约论的内在诉求,对契约之公平性的证成存在事实和价值两条路径。前者试图用历史事实来说明证成起点的真实性,后者采取思想实验的手段论证证成起点的价值合理性。近代契约论同时诉诸事实和价值,但其基础主义色彩使这两种路径同时失效。当代契约论则以"康德式"建构主义立场将证成重心置于价值维度,引入动态化的思想实验来不断消解证成起点可能带有的独断性。不过,纯粹的价值性论证无法使"康德式"建构主义的契约推理逻辑走向彻底,而是不得不在逻辑推理的起点再次引入事实维度。

There are two routes, namely fact and value, of justification to the fairness of social contract theory. The route of fact attempts to prove that the starting point of justification is true by historical facts while the value route aims to justify that some certain values are reasonable by thought experiments. Modern social contract theory appeals to the route of fact and value at the same time, however, its background of foundationalism leads them both to failure. Contemporary theory of social contract se- lected the value route as the right one in the position of Kantian constructivism and brought a kind of dynamic experiment to dis- pel the arbitrariness of logical starting point. However, Kantian constructivism still has to bring the route of fact to the justifica- tion, or it can＇t be a thorough political methodology.