Order in Transitional China and Its Institutional Logic

中国转型秩序的形成不仅仅是制度供给问题，也是国家在转型时期的特殊角色和职能界定问题。改革开放以来，国家寻求实现社会主义经济高速增长和维持稳定的双重治理目标，这需要其同时承担作为现代政府和国家资本的双重角色。为此而进行的治理结构调整的特征表现为：对市场让权，但保留政府定价权；对地方放权，但保留中心工作权；对社会确权，但保留组织准入权。这一“准分权治理结构”在机制层面引发的外部性表现为集体福利机制消散、日常生活安全机制缺失和政府市场获利机制构建。这可能会影响政府职能的工具化和公共权力的资本化，并由此产生社会权利分配失衡、财富分配失衡与风险分配失衡，即社会不稳定。

The development of order in transitional China is not merely a matter of institutional supply, hut also a matter of defining the state＇s special roles and functions in the transition period. Since reform and opening up, China has sought to realize the twin governance aims of high speed development of the socialist economy and maintenance of stability, which require that the state simultaneously undertake the dual roles of modern government and national capital. The consequent adjustments to the governance structure are expressed in the state＇s devolution of power to the market while reserving government pricing power; devolution of power to local governments while reserving power over central tasks; and affirming social rights while reserving the power to approve social organizations. At the institutional level, the externalities produced by this ＂quasi-decentralized governance structure＂ are marked by the shrinkage of arrangements for collective welfare, the absence of mechanisms for routine security in ordinary life, and the development of mechanisms that allow the government to profit from the market. This may result in the instrumentalization of government functions and the capitalization of public power, producing imbalances in the distribution of social rights, wealth and risk, or in other words, social instability.