摘要
我国原料乳生产模式仍以散户和小规模模式为主,且原料乳收购环节的质量控制措施有待完善,这些因素不仅影响原料乳质量水平的提高,同时也制约着我国乳制品行业的发展。文章基于奶农与乳制品企业非对称质量保障行为的演化博弈模型,分析了不同条件下奶农与乳企质量保障行为的动态演化过程;研究结果表明,系统具有多种演化路径,小区养殖成本与散养成本差额是影响最终演化稳定策略的重要因素;在此基础上,进行数值仿真模拟并提出相关政策建议。
Nowadays, raw milk is mainly supplied China but the quality control in the purchase link by smallholder dairy farmers or small-scale feeding bases in of raw milk proves to be insufficient. This is a hindrance to raw milk quality control and the dairy industry development in China. Based on an asymmetrical evolutionary game model, this paper analyzes the dynamic evolution process of quality guarantee behaviors on the part of dairy farmers and dairy enterprises under different conditions. The results show that the evolution of system has multiple equilibriums, and the evolutionary stable strategies are largely affected by the cost differences be- tween scatter-feed and plot-breeding. Finally, some stimulation-based policy recommendations are proposed.
出处
《大连理工大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2017年第2期86-92,共7页
Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)
基金
国家"十二五"科技支撑计划项目:"村镇服务业与相关产业协同发展关键技术研究"(2014BAL07B05)
2014年国家社会科学基金项目:"粮食应急储备网络运作机理与模型优化研究"(14BGL062)
关键词
原料乳生产收购
质量保障
演化博弈
production and purchase link of raw milk
quality guarantee
evolutionary game theory