晋升激励与国有企业异常捐赠

Promotion Incentives and Abnormal Donations in State-owned Enterprises

结合资源依赖理论,以2008—2014年国有企业上市公司为研究样本,对国企高管谋求政治晋升而产生的相关后果进行实证检验并提供经验证据。研究发现,在国有企业中普遍存在着异常社会捐赠问题。进一步研究发现,国企中存在的异常社会捐赠与其高管的任职年限呈负相关关系,也即高管任职年限越短,其晋升的可能性越大,该企业的异常捐赠额度越高。这从一定程度上说明了国企高管为了谋求政治晋升而有意识地进行了国企的社会形象管理,意在提高自身的社会形象,从而为自身的政治晋升做好铺垫。央企高管比地方国企高管更加注重社会形象管理,公益类国企高管进行社会形象管理的动机比竞争类国企高管更加强烈。此外,某些外部环境变量,如年度和行业等对实证结果没有显著影响。

Based on the resource dependence theory, this paper takes the listed companies of stateowned enterprises from 2008--2014 as the research samples, and conducts empirical tests on the relevant consequences of the state-owned enterprises executives seeking political promotion as well as provides empirical evidence. The research found that there is a widespread problem of social donation in state-owned enterprises. Further research found that the abnormal social donation in state-owned enterprises was negatively correlated with the length of service of exec- utives. It means that the shorter the working years of executives, the higher the possibility of their promotion, and the higher the amount of abnormal donation. To some extent, it shows that the executives consciously carry out the social image management of state-owned enterprises for seeking political promotion, which intends to improve their social image, so as to pave the way for their own political promotiomThe central enterprise executives attach more importance to social image management than local state-owned enterprise executives. Executives of stateowned enterprise for public interest are more eager to establish the social image than those of state-owned enterprises for profit. In addition, some external environment variables, such as years and industry, have no significant impact on empirical results.