自私性机会网络中的节点激励策略研究

Research on Incentive Strategy of Nodes in Selfish Opportunistic Network

机会网络中的节点由于自身资源受限,在转发消息时具有自私性。为了激励节点相互合作,已经提出的激励策略用虚拟货币激励自私节点转发消息,但存在虚拟货币不足和虚假报价的问题。为解决上述问题,提出一种基于可透支虚拟货币机制的节点激励策略。该策略设计了可透支的虚拟货币机制,以节点消息转发能力作为货币透支担保来解决虚拟货币不足的问题;策略中的交易机制保持资源状态和财富状态公开,如果消息交易无法一次完成,交易双方将根据对方的资源状态和财富状态友好地进行二次议价来抑制节点虚假报价的问题。仿真实验验证了该策略中节点激励机制的有效性以及可透支虚拟货币机制的有效性,并证明该策略有效地抑制了节点的虚假报价现象。

Nodes in opportunistic network are selfish due to limited resource when transmitting messages.In order to encourage nodes to cooperate with each other,the incentive strategies have been proposed to use virtual currency to motivate selfish nodes to transmit messages,but there exist problems of virtual currency shortage and mendacious offer.With the purpose of solving the above problems,this paper proposed a node incentive strategy based on the mechanism of overdraft virtual currency.The strategy designs mechanism of overdraft virtual currency,which uses the ability of messages transmitting of a node as monetary overdraft guarantee to solve the problem of virtual currency shortage.The resource and wealth status are public in the trading mechanism of the strategy,if the message transaction cannot be completed once,the two sides will friendly bargain based on resource and wealth status to suppress the issue of mendacious offer.Simulation results show that the proposed strategy is of effectiveness of the strategy and mechanism of virtual currency,and can suppress the issue of mendacious offer.