气候大会碳排放谈判的博弈分析

A Game Theory Analysis of the COP Negotiation on Carbon Emissions

联合国气候变化大会是目前全球范围内最为重要的气候环境会议之一,其关注的重点是参与国的碳排放谈判和碳限制。基于博弈的思想,构建出一个气候大会碳排放谈判的博弈模型。并基于该模型,采用中国的相关数据来解释目前的谈判现状。结果发现,这一模型符合IPCC对发展中国家的要求。其次根据对比结果可知,中国目前在碳排放博弈中尚未完全掌握主导权。建议中国在全球碳排放谈判中要坚持以单位GDP碳排放作为减排指标,同时动态调整减排目标和路径。

COP is one of the most important environmental conferences in the worldwide place, which focuses on the carbon emissions negotiation and carbon restricts among the conference members. This paper, based on the game theory,builds a COP carbon emissions game model and tries to explain the current negotiation situation with the related Chinese data. The results show that the model is in line with the IPCC requirements of developing countries. Through comparison and analysis,China is not taking a complete dominance in the carbon emissions bargaining. This paper suggests that China should regard the unit GDP of carbon emissions as emission reduction targets in the global carbon emissions negotiations and dynamically adjusts the target and trajectory of the emission reductions.