管理层变更伴随着更严格的内部控制缺陷认定标准吗?

Are Management Turnover Associated with Stricter Criteria of Internal Control Weaknesses?

管理层变更的一个重要预期效果是为了更好地服务于股东利益;但新任管理层也可能存在卸责动机,即在刚上任时尽量降低自身的考核标准,以便随后更容易实现考核目标。我们考察了管理层变更后的财务报告内部控制缺陷认定标准的变化特征,以检验上述两个竞争性假说。基于手工搜集的2011-2014年间我国上市公司内控缺陷认定标准及其变更数据,结果显示,在新任管理层的首个完整任职年份,内控缺陷标准更可能向宽松方向调整。这意味着给定同样的内控缺陷后果,管理层更不需要将有关缺陷披露为重大或重要缺陷。我们的证据支持新任管理层的卸责假说,而非股东利益最大化假说。

One of expected effects of management turnover is to better serve the shareholders'interests.However,the incoming management may have a shirking problem,whereby the management lowers the performance standards for her term to realize the target more easily.We examine how Chinese listed companies change the criteria of financial report-related internal control weaknesses(ICW)following top management turnover.Based on hand-collected data of ICW criteria during the period 2011-2014,we find that the ICW criteria tend to be loosened in the incoming management's first full year of her tenure,which means that all other things equal,it is less demanding for the incoming management to identify and disclose an ICW.Therefore,our evidence is more consistent with the incoming management shirking the accountability,rather than maximizing shareholder's interests.