带有资金约束的风险厌恶零售商的双渠道供应链运作策略

Dual-channel Supply Chain Decision with a Risk-averse Retailer under the Capital Constraint

在对称信息框架下,针对一个风险中性的双渠道制造商和一个存在资金约束的风险厌恶零售商组成的供应链系统,基于Stackelberg博弈理论构建了两种不同的融资模式下(延期支付模式与金融机构借贷模式)双渠道供应链的最优运作决策模型。通过模型分析,分别给出了两种不同融资模式下零售商和制造商的最优运作策略。研究发现,当零售商资金充足或存在资金约束但通过两种不同融资模式融资时,风险中性的双渠道制造商都更愿意和具有风险厌恶特性的零售商合作。当零售商资金不足时,制造商延期支付合同的设计可以有效解决零售商资金不足问题,实现供应链无资金约束时的收益。进一步研究指出,尽管金融机构提供借贷,但在一定条件下,零售商始终不会选择金融机构借贷模式。数值例子发现当制造商对延期支付时间长度敏感性很低时,零售商会偏爱金融机构借贷融资模式。否则,零售商始终偏爱延期支付模式。

In the symmetric information framework, a dual-channel supply chain model is considered, in which the retailer is risk-averse and capital constrained. By using the Stackelberg game theory, a deferred payment model and a loan - payment model are constructed to dispose the retailer＇ s capital insufficient problem. Through the analysis of the model, the retailer and manufacturer＇ s optimal operation strategies are given under the two different financing models. It is showed that the risk neutral manufacturer is more willing to cooperate with the risk-averse retailer. When the retailer is capital constraint, the manufacturer＇ s deferred payment contract can effectively solve the retailer＇s insufficient funds problem. Finally, we provide a detailed numerical example to illustrate the mode and give some meaningful management implications.