带层次结构效用可转移合作对策的τ值

τ value of transferable utility cooperative games with level structures

给出了带层次结构效用可转移合作对策τ值的分配过程,研究了它所满足的性质,并对其进行了公理化.另外,关注这种τ值在带层次结构破产对策中的应用,证明了带层次结构破产对策的τ值解等于原带层次结构破产问题的调整比例法则解.此外,由于τ值只能定义在拟均衡对策上,本文将拟均衡对策的概念扩展到带层次结构拟均衡对策,并给出了相当大的一类带层次结构拟均衡对策.

The τ- value of transferable utility cooperative games with level structures is studied. Specifically, the allocation procedure and the properties of this T value are studied, and an axiomatization of it is given. Furthermore, applications of this y value to bankruptcy games with level structures are discussed. In these situations, an important property of this τ- value that it is equal to the adjusted proportional rule solution of the primal bankruptcy problem with a level structure is proved. In addition, as the τ- value can only be defined in quasi-balanced games, this paper expands the notion of quasi-balanced games to transferable utility cooperative games with level structures, and a reasonably large class of quasi-balanced transferable utility cooperative games with level structures are given.