摘要
This paper argues that St. Anselm＇s distinction of the two senses of existence in his ontological argument for the existence of God renders Paul Tillich＇s refutation of it invalid. At the same time, Anselm misuses the two types of existence in his ontological comparison, leading to a logical contradiction between the different kinds and degrees of existence. Since Anselm＇s idea of different reference subjects does not coherently solve this logical absurdity, Anselm＇s ontological argument falls well short of being a successful approach to establishing the existence of God.
This paper argues that St. Anselm＇s distinction of the two senses of existence in his ontological argument for the existence of God renders Paul Tillich＇s refutation of it invalid. At the same time, Anselm misuses the two types of existence in his ontological comparison, leading to a logical contradiction between the different kinds and degrees of existence. Since Anselm＇s idea of different reference subjects does not coherently solve this logical absurdity, Anselm＇s ontological argument falls well short of being a successful approach to establishing the existence of God.
