关联方交易、内部控制质量与审计收费

Executive Turnover,Product-Market Competition and Quality of Nonfinancial Information Disclosures

本文以2009—2014年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从内部控制的角度对关联方交易与审计收费关系进行了实证研究。研究发现,关联方交易显著提高了上市公司的审计费用;内部控制质量与审计收费之间呈正相关关系,且处于倒"U"型关系的上升阶段,审计的规模效益在研究中没有呈现。进一步研究发现,虽然内部控制缓解了关联方交易对审计收费的正向作用,但统计上内部控制并不能很好地抑制关联方交易带来的审计风险。

With the A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2015 as research objects, this article conducts an empirical research on the impacts of executive turnover and product-market competition on non-financial information disclosures. The research shows that executive turnover exerts a negative influence on such disclosures, while the productmarket competition exerts a positive influence. To further explore the interactions between these two relations, this article divides the listed companies into two control groups based on the degree of productmarket competition and finds that product-market competition exacerbates the negative influence of executive turnover on the quality of non-financial information disclosures, while opportunism behaviors are more likely to occur in the listed companies in highly competitive industries through executive turnover.