摘要
并购重组作为资源配置的重要手段,在资本市场上发挥的作用越来越重要,其中并购重组中大股东操纵资产定价的问题更是得到了各界广泛关注。将资产收购关联交易作为研究样本,考察了我国上市公司产权交易中,大股东操纵标的资产定价的行为对企业权益资本成本的影响。通过研究发现,大股东对资产评估结果的操纵总体上提高了企业的权益资本成本,这一结果在掏空组的检验中尤为显著。且不管是基于支持还是掏空上市公司的目的,大股东对资产评估结果的操纵都损害了中小投资者的利益,加大了中小投资者的投资风险。
As an important means of resource allocation,MA plays an important role in the capital market. Meanwhile,the manipulation of assets pricing in MA has been the focus of attention from all walks of life. In this paper,the asset acquisition of related party transactions as a sample,we test the impact of the large shareholders manipulating the underlying asset pricing on the cost of equity capital in the property rights trading of listed companies in China. Through the study,we find that the manipulation of asset revaluation will increase the cost of equity capital. The relation between the manipulation of asset revaluation and the cost of equity capital in tunneling group is significantly positive. And whether it is based on the purpose of tunneling or propping the listed company,the manipulation of asset revaluation has damaged the small and medium investors' interests and increased their investment risk.
出处
《湘潭大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第3期63-67,共5页
Journal of Xiangtan University:Philosophy And Social Sciences
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目"国家治理
国家审计制度与预防惩治腐败体系创新研究"(项目编号:13AZD002)
国家社会科学基金项目"基于第三方风险动态监控平台的知识产权质押融资模式研究(项目编号:14BGL034)
关键词
资产评估操纵
资产收购
大股东
manipulation of asset revaluation
asset acquisitions
large shareholders