上市公司高管显性激励治理效应研究——基于“双向治理”研究视角的经验证据

An Empirical Analysis on Executive Incentive's Effectiveness:A Perspective of “Two-way” Governance

由于实际控制人的存在,中国上市公司的高管激励研究需要将实际控制人的影响纳入高管激励研究中。基于此,本文引入"双向治理"研究视角,期望通过考察实际控制人在高管显性激励安排有效性中的影响,即高管迎合实际控制人需要的管理层权力,探索中国上市公司高管显性激励安排的治理效应。研究发现,货币化薪酬呈现积极的治理效应,但是高管持股却容易诱发代理问题,并且弱化货币化薪酬的激励效果。进一步分析得知,高管期权激励的作用主要体现在货币化薪酬与代理成本关系的调节效应中,并且主要见于民营企业和高科技行业。本文研究表明,中国情境下更为有效的高管显性激励组合应该是充分考虑实际控制人的潜在影响,构建货币化薪酬与期权激励的有机结合,同时还需要兼顾高管持股的负面治理效应和期权激励的适用情境,进一步优化上市公司高管显性激励的制度安排。

In this paper,we make use of the panel data from 2009 to 2013 of Chinese A-share listed companies to explore the effectiveness of executives＇ incentives by ＂two-way＂ governance perspective.In order to extend the theoretical border of executives＇ incentive,this paper presents several contributions to current research：first,we analyze the systematic effects of different incentive arrangements,rather than one specific arrangement,such as compensation or ownership,which is the main stream of current studies;second,this paper focuses on the executives＇ motivation upon different incentive arrangements and the relationship with shareholders,especially ultimate owners,which introduced the interactivity of shareholders and executives into traditional agent theory and corporate governance theory.Then,the paper offers a new theoretical perspective of managerial power theory,which means that managerial power should cater to ultimate owner＇s demand;third,this paper demonstrates the effective arrangements of executives＇ incentive,compensation as main basis and options as complements,which is testified with empirical analysis.Meanwhile,two things should be noticed：the negative effects of executives＇ ownership and the contexts in which options could play positive effects,so that to ensure the effectiveness of incentive arrangements.We find that compensation incentives could significantly reduce agency costs,but the executive ownership may lead to higher agency costs,and weaken the positive effects of compensation incentives.Further analysis reveals that option incentives can exert moderating effect to the relationship between compensation incentives and agency costs.Meanwhile,in comparison to stated-owned firms or the firms of traditional industries,the moderating effect is more significant in private-owned firms and high-tech industries.The conclusions of this paper reveal that in Chinese context,the effective arrangements should make good use of compensation incentives and stock options.Additionally,shareholders should also take the negative effects of executive ownership into account,and notice the context in which options may be effective.