中国上市公司自愿性积极业绩预告:利公还是利私——基于大股东减持的经验证据

Do Voluntary Positive Earnings Forecasts of Chinese Listed Companies Benefit Public or Private Interests?Empirical Evidence Based on the Major Shareholders' Selling of Non-tradable Shares

本文对大股东^(1)减持前中国A股上市公司披露的自愿性业绩预告是否具有自利动机、有何市场反应进行了实证检验。结果表明,在大股东减持前,上市公司自愿发布积极业绩预告的概率显著更高;在大股东减持年度,自愿性积极业绩预告的披露频率显著更高;且减持前的自愿性积极业绩预告具有显著更高的超额回报。以上证据表明,上市公司在大股东减持前发布的自愿性积极业绩预告,更大概率上出于大股东的私利,违背了公开、公平、公正披露的原则。本文的研究丰富了自愿性业绩预告动机的文献,为改进中国证券市场信息披露和大股东减持的监管提供了科学的证据。

The information disclosure mechanism of listed companies includes mandatory and voluntary disclosure mechanism.Different information disclosure mechanism may bring different economic consequence.Companies communicate with their stakeholders by mandatory information disclosure mechanism under the rules.Voluntary reporting supplements mandatory information disclosure which disclosure decisions are often made directly by managers.Because the ownership of listed companies are relatively concentrated in China,managers＇ decisions reflect largely the willing of the major shareholders,involving the information disclosure decisions.According to Chinese Stock Exchange Rules,listed companies＇ management earnings forecasts are divided into mandatory and voluntary earnings forecasts.Compared with the former,when,how frequently and what kind of voluntary earnings forecasts are disclosed almost entirely depends on the discretion of the managers and the major shareholders.Therefore the voluntary management earnings forecasts＇ disclosure decisions are subjected to greater extent to the drive by the managers＇ or the major shareholders＇ benefits.In this paper,we examine whether Chinese listed companies＇ voluntary earnings forecasts have self-benefited motives before the major shareholders＇ selling of original non-tradable shares,and how the capital market reacts.If the voluntary earnings forecasts of listed companies are for the purpose to open private information in order to achieve ‘fairness＇ and ‘justice＇,the type,frequency and disclosure timing of the forecasts should be independent of the major shareholders＇ transactions.On the other hand,if the voluntary management earnings forecasts are due for the managers＇ or the shareholders＇ private interests,the timing,type and frequency of them should be observed in accordance with the major shareholders＇ self-interest transactions.At the same time,we can observe that the positive voluntary earnings forecasts have much stronger market response.In this study we have found that before the selling of the major shareholders,the managers of listed companies are prone to releasing positive voluntary performance predictions;during the shares reduction year of the major shareholders,the frequency of the disclose is much more higher;these forecasts before the major stockholders＇ selling have significant higher excess market returns.The evidence suggests that voluntary positive management earnings forecasts are for the major shareholders＇ self-interested motive rather than for the open,fair and just disclosure purpose which damages the allocation efficiency of the capital market.This paper enriches the understanding of voluntary management earnings forecasts＇ incentives literature and provides scientific evidence to improve the information disclosure and insider trading supervision in China＇s security market.