研发竞赛中的技术偏袒策略——基于公共产品技术创新理论

Public Technology Discrimination in R&D Contest——Based on Public Goods Technology Innovation

公共产品技术创新与企业技术创新相比具有不同的特征,研发竞赛作为一种有效的技术获取方式,在公共产品技术创新中得到较多应用。把技术偏袒规则作为政府部门决策过程中的内生变量,分析政府部门应用研发竞赛获取技术过程中如何制定偏袒策略问题是研究重点。在构建模型基础之上,分析研发竞赛中参与企业研发实力的差别程度,以及政府能否充分了解企业研发实力以及能否对企业提供的产品进行准确评价等因素对政府制定偏袒策略的影响。最后进行总结,分析理论研究对政府部门制定策略的现实意义。

Compared with the technology innovation of enterprises, the public goods technology innovation has different characteristics. The research and development contest as an effective way to obtain the technology innovation of public products has been widely used. Taking the technical discrimination rules as the endogenous variables of the government decision-making process, we analyze the process of how the authority develops the technical discrimination rules. We analyze the differential degree of R＆D capabilities among enterprises, the ability of governments to evaluate the enterprise R＆D strength and the ability of governments to evaluate products quality accurately in order to evaluate the effect of these factors. And then, we illustrate the practical significance of these technical discrimination strategies.