国有企业高管限薪:有效管制还是过度干预

Restriction of Executive Compensation of SOEs: Effective Regulation or Over-Interference?

本文以2013年到2014年国家相继推出国有企业高管薪酬管制政策作为对于金融市场国有上市公司的冲击事件,分别检验各单一事件和混合事件的市场反应。研究发现,此次国有企业改革背景下对于国有企业管理者薪酬的限制并不是对企业活动的过度干预,而是有效的管制;并且,无论使用绝对薪酬水平还是超额薪酬水平都发现国有上市公司的管理者薪酬水平越高,其市场反应越大。在获得市场肯定的同时,国有企业管理者薪酬制度改革有待于进一步深化。

Using events affecting executive compensation of state owned listed companies( SOEs) as financial shocking between the years of 2013-2014,the market reaction to these events is studied individually and as a whole shock. It is found that as a policy of state owned enterprise reform,the market has a positive effect for the companies involved. And the state-owned enterprises with a high level of executive compensation are associated with a higher market reaction,compared with those with a low level of executive compensation.While this compensation limited policy is an effective regulation,the SOEs need a further reform in the near future.